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1. Introduction: The Civilizing Mission in Ireland, America and India
From the middle of the eighteenth century onwards the British began to create as well as 
to conceptualize colonial rule in South Asia. Starting from Bengal in 1757, British terri-
tory on the South Asian Subcontinent expanded continuously until the end of the nine-
teenth century. This did not happen without serious setbacks, for example, the rebellion 
in Bihar and Bengal from 1781 to 1784, the Kabul catastrophe in 1842, or the Great 
Rebellion from 1857 to 1859; the first and the last events almost terminated British rule 
Comparativ | Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung 25 (2015) Heft 5 / 6, S. 47–67.
4 | Michael Mann
in India. Despite such setbacks, at the end of World War I the British Empire in South 
Asia spanned from Peshawar in the northwest to Tennasserim on the Malay Peninsula in 
the southeast and from Kashmir in the Himalaya to Point Galle on the island of Ceylon 
in the south. Yet, both expansion and setbacks shaped and sharpened British self-per-
ception as a civilized nation, a superior race, while simultaneously also as a vulnerable 
species. Hence the British were convinced that they had to protect themselves against the 
evils of climatic, animal and human threats in South Asia as elsewhere in their mostly 
tropical colonial empire. 
From the beginning of territorial rule in South Asia, the British imagined themselves 
as superior beings with respect to culture and civilization, in particular in regard to the 
“modern” state and its legal system, moral values, rational sciences and Protestantism. 
Like other western European “nations-in-the-making,” the British developed or, rather, 
invented the catalogue of characteristics according to which that superiority could be 
claimed. This self-estimation was particularly true for the English “nation.” Neighboring 
peoples such as the Scots, as all Celts, were regarded as substantially inferior to English 
civilization standards. The Irish were seen as the most savage people at the westernmost 
fringe of Europe. From the turn of the sixteenth century, when the crown and parlia-
ment of England transformed Ireland into a colony, they became an object of policing 
and punishment which the English regarded as an appropriate means for the former’s 
civil and moral uplifting.1
At the same time, the English started to colonize Chesapeake Bay in Virginia then, 
some years later, New Hampshire and other parts of the North American subcontinent, 
thereby transplanting that recently developed ideology of a civilizing mission from Ire-
land to North America.2 American Indians were also seen as savages and, at best, they 
were termed “naturals.” Whilst stories about Pocahontas and John Rolfe became part 
of a modern myth, they too often romanticized early “cultural encounters” as rare but, 
nevertheless, true love stories in an otherwise rather harsh colonial environment.3 A 
second, similarly important ingredient of the early colonizing ideology was embodied in 
the idea of a Protestant empire across the Atlantic. It was to be an empire independent 
of the Catholic Holy-Roman Empire, allegedly supported by the Pope and dominated 
by the worldwide successful colonizing “southern” Spanish Habsburgs. At the beginning 
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particular that of England’s, the Netherlands’ and Scandinavia) kingdoms’ right for such 
a Protestant empire.4
Like all colonizing empires, the English also soon developed the idea of a civilizing 
mission as an integrated ideology for their colonial program. With regard to America, 
civilization was seen as the only salvation for the native inhabitants. Early English colo-
nists in North America defended their violent and sometimes even brutal treatment of 
Amerindians, arguing that the violence and injury by the Romans on Europe was part 
of their historical mission of civil uplifting. Without the encounter with the Romans, 
Britons would still live as a rude and untutored people, wandering in the woods or dwell-
ing in caves, hunting for their dinners as wild beasts hunt in the forests for their prey, 
prostituting their daughters to strangers and sacrificing their children to idols. The Ro-
mans’ treatment therefore, it was maintained, turned the land of savages into the land of 
Shakespeare.5 When Lord Delaware, the designated first governor of the newly founded 
colony of Virginia, left England to set the fledgling colony on a sound footing, he was 
publically praised as civilizer and apostle. The priestly sermon again drew on the idea of 
the Romans for civilization and, additionally, on the Apostles for religion.6
The backbone of that religion was Protestant Puritanism as it trans-shipped, for example, 
the Atlantic with the well-known Pilgrim Fathers. Such Protestant and Puritan identity 
became particularly important during the seventeenth century and the Stuart Restora-
tion.7 Additionally, by the end of that century, Protestant belief and an ideology justify-
ing at least a mission on a global scale was placed on the agenda of the Franckesche Stif-
tungen in Halle, a small town located in the middle of Europe, which, however, hosted 
Prussia’s first university and the country’s largest orphanage. August Herman Francke 
(1663–1727), professor of theology at the aforementioned university, priest of a local 
church and president of the orphanage, became one of the leading figures in what was to 
become known as Pietismus. Related to English Puritanism for its rather “pure” practic-
ing principles, Pietists were famous for their “Christentum der Tat.”
8
Faced with dramatic poverty and misery in large parts of central Europe, an ongoing 
result of the Thirty Years War (1618–48), as well as significant suppression of Protestants 
throughout Europe as in England during the Stuart Restoration and in France after the 














50 | Michael Mann
to reform Protestantism and developed an outwardly oriented religious practice. Making 
God’s grace visible through good deeds became the core of this new religious approach. 
Pietists in Halle conferred themselves to an inner mission, which aimed to relieve poor 
people and particularly orphans from their misery.9 An essential part of that mission was, 
of course, preaching the gospels. This kind of mission was soon to be expanded to all 
people, as it was (again) believed that, for example, “Indians” in the east and west, as well 
as “Mongols” in Siberia or “Negroes” in Africa desperately needed religious instruction 
for their moral and material improvement, the latter being a new aspect in the Protestant 
missionaries’ civilizing ideology.10 
It was against this background that in 1706 the Danish-English-Halle Mission was 
founded, and soon after, two Halle Pietists were sent as missionaries to Tranquebar, the 
Danish fort and settlement close to present day Madras/Chennai. From the very begin-
ning the mission was logistically and financially supported by the London based Society 
for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge. Protestant missionary activities created a 
Protestant network in a northern European dimension. Yet, since the royal charter of the 
English East India Company (EIC) prohibited missionary activities within its territories, 
the mission remained restricted to Tranquebar and Serampur, the Danish settlement in 
Bengal close to Calcutta.11 In England, however, it was the awakening movement in the 
mid-eighteenth century and eventually the so-called Evangelicals that gave a fresh im-
petus to colonization and the civilizing mission in the closing decades of the eighteenth 
century. Like Halle Pietists, London Evangelicals also promoted the idea of both inner 
and outer moral and material betterment. Local British, mostly urban, as well as Indian 
societies were turned into an object of missionary activities whilst the extended ideol-
ogy of the civilization mission enhanced the idea of an imagined English and Protestant 
superiority, be it in Ireland, in America or in India.12
In other words, within the colonial landscape of the British Isles and early coloniza-
tion of North America, the imagined superiority of the English people’s tastes, manners, 
morals and religion also helped to shape the likewise imagined superiority in what was 
to become British India. An example of such related attitudes may be seen in the Eng-
lish administration system of Ireland during the nineteenth century, since legislation 
for that part of the British Empire often became the blueprint for a similar legislation 
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Cornwallis, for example, the defeated general of the British forces at Yorktown, Virginia, 
which terminated the war of the American colonists in 1782, became Governor General 
of British India between 1786 and 1793. After this term he was appointed Viceroy of 
Ireland, where he stayed from 1795 to 1801. He then returned for a second term as 
Governor General of British India in 1805. However, he died a couple of months after 
his arrival in Calcutta.14
Within this global colonial setting the British invented a catalogue of characteristics as a 
civilized and a civilizing people. Equipped with the above-mentioned values, Evangeli-
cals further developed the idea of a self-burdened civilizing mission at the turn of the 
eighteenth century. Protagonists like William Wilberforce and Charles Grant started a 
global program for human relief with a campaign against slavery and the slave trade. It 
became the trans-Atlantic topic from 1807 when the slave trade was officially prohibited 
in the British Empire until the closing decades of the nineteenth century when Brazil 
abolished slavery in 1889.15 In South Asia and bordering regions, however, the Christian 
mission became the object of Evangelical agitation.16 Yet, even when the Protestant mis-
sion was permitted after the renewal of the charter for the EIC in 1813, missionaries 
from various missionary organizations faced a world of many beliefs in this part of the 
globe which limited their activities as well as the number of conversions.17
In fact, what was actually needed as ideology legitimizing colonial rule in British India 
was not the Bible and Christian books but moral values based on what was regarded to 
be Christian principles. The civilizing mission was never a means solely for the salvation 
of people stigmatized as savage and uncivilized but, simultaneously, a means for the sal-
vation of that part of British society that was seen as “fallen,” such as prostitutes, loafers, 
vagrants, and drunkards, many of whom belonged to the poor, paupers and socially de-
prived.18 However, these values basically reflected Victorian christlich-bürgerliche values 
of discipline, punctuality, controlled sexuality, rational behavior and sociability, which 
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strength.19 Both mental and physical strength were seen as fundamental for white supe-
riority throughout the world. Therefore, the civilizing mission, coupled with Christian 
charity, set out to save the world.20 For colonial South Asia, the following examples il-
lustrate the self-alleged European superiority in the colonial world of the British Empire 
in India and Indian responses towards such attitudes.
2.    The Imagined Indian Village Republic and the Self-Perception  
of European Modernity
Comments on the Indian village and its seemingly permanent existence throughout his-
tory appeared from time to time before the end of the eighteenth century. Yet, with 
growing territorial-colonial rule in South Asia, the British, in the reports on the country, 
categorized the Indian village as revenue making and therefore as an administrative unit. 
To stabilize the colonial regime which was based on agriculture, the British soon started 
to mold the description of Indian villages into a totalizing, homogenizing and essential-
izing image. This image became part of what Edward Said has identified as Oriental-
ism.21 Apart from this “Eurocentric” approach, it is, however, interesting to note how 
the British, on the one hand, perceived Indian social and economic life and, on the other 
hand, how Indians adopted that stereotype and used it for their own political ends. “Tra-
ditional” India, as will be seen, continues to be connected with the Indian village whilst 
urban city life is associated with “modernity.”
Yet, how did the essence of Indian culture and economy come into existence? As men-
tioned above, it was the colonial state’s administrative needs that produced the idea of a 
stable village community. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Fifth Report on 
the Affairs of the EIC, compiled by a parliamentary commission, stated: 
The country is divided into villages. A village, geographically, is a trade of country com-
prising some hundreds or thousands of acres of arable and waste land; – a village, politi-
cally, is a little republic, or rather a corporation, having with itself, municipal officers and 
corporate artificers: its boundaries are seldom altered; and though sometimes injured, or 
even desolated by war, famine, and even families, continue for ages.22
A few decades later, the well-known British administrator of Delhi and its hinterland 
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The Village Communities are little Republics, having nearly everything that they want 
within themselves, and almost independent from foreign relations. They seem to last 
where nothing lasts. Dynasty after dynasty tumbles down; revolution succeeds revolution; 
Hindu, Pathan, Moghal, Mahratta, Sikh, English, are masters in turn; but the Village 
Communities remain the same…23
As if the contents of the two statements could not be claimed for England or any other 
village of the world, Karl Marx identified these characteristics as unique to India. In Das 
Kapital (1867) he wrote:
Jene uraltertümlichen, kleinen indischen Gemeinwesen, die zum Teil noch fortexistieren, 
beruhen auf gemeinschaftlichem Besitz des Grund und Bodens, auf der unmittelbaren 
Verbindung von Agrikultur und Handwerk … Der einfache produktive Organismus 
dieser selbstgenügsamen Gemeinwesen, die sich beständig in derselben Form reproduz-
ieren und, wenn zufällig zerstört, mit demselben Namen, wieder aufbauen.24
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Max Weber was convinced that “Indien ist 
und war, ganz im Gegensatz zu China, das Land der Dörfer…”25 At the same time in 
India, leading politicians also became deeply influenced by this orientalist discourse. 
Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869–1948), from 1930 onwards also known as Mahatma, con-
demned urbanization and all forms of urban life as an evil western influence upon India. 
Big cities in India as elsewhere were not regarded as melting pots of cultures but seen as 
hot spots of violence, crime, disease and degeneration.26 It is rather superfluous to men-
tion that the British, too, perceived Indian cities as dirty, filthy and chaotic places. On 
the other hand, only the planned and clean cantonments, the civil and military stations 
were regarded as sanitary and therefore civilized places in British India. Superior town 
planning was set in sharp contrast to overcrowded Indian cities. Yet it must be noted that 
serious concerns about the negative effects of urbanization in Europe were also formu-
lated by contemporary European critiques. The garden city movement with its attitudes 
of rustic life was the most prominent outcome of such discontent with urbanization.27 
Romanticized English village life also influenced the construction of the peaceful, para-
dise-like and eternal Indian village, particularly during the second half of the nineteenth 
century.28 For Gandhi the village was the kernel of South Asia’s societies, a marker of 
“India’s” national identity as well as the perfect economic unit. According to him the 
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constitute one community and work in harmony.29 On the other hand, many Indians 
concerned about modernizing India did not rely solely upon the village but on large 
scale industrialization. As the British had only developed specific industries like cotton 
weaving in Bombay and Ahmedabad and jute weaving in Calcutta, Indian nationalists 
regarded full-blown industrialization as the only remedy to cure India’s overall poverty. 
Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) especially argued in favor of India’s industrialization af-
ter independence by initiating many discussions between himself and Gandhi during the 
1930s and 1940s.30 During the 1950s and early 1960s, Nehru and the Congress Party 
organized India’s modernization by founding industrial plants and “model towns.”31 It is 
interesting to note that meanwhile Nehru had adopted European views of his own with 
regards to urban sanitation and civilization to radically solve the problem demonstrated 
by Delhi’s “slums.”32
As will be seen in the next section of this chapter, most urban Indian dwellers regarded 
the city as an exciting and promising place. In colonial South Asia, the town and city also 
represented modernity during the nineteenth and twentieth century. Cities were seen as 
places of encounter and exchange and set in contrast to backward villages and villagers. 
In the perception of the Indian educated classes the dichotomy of “urban” and “civilized” 
and “rural” and “uncivilized” also accounted for South Asia. Yet, the British idea of su-
periority did not work particularly well in the urban environment as Indians seemingly 
shared the same or at least similar values. For the British, of course, that perception 
did not matter at all as they insisted upon their concepts of superior town planning, 
advanced urban sanitary politics and the creation of a healthy urban environment in 
an otherwise unhealthy and therefore dangerous sub-continental Indian environment.33 
British civil and military stations were self-constructed islands of an alleged “modernity;” 
this term was used as a synonym for civilization and superiority. Yet, it was only in the 
colonial setting that the British could create and demonstrate an image of self-claimed 
superiority.
3. Brahman and British Images of an Ideal British-Indian Society
According a regionally north-Indian Brahman ideal created some 2000 years ago, the 
imagined Hindu-society consisted of four varna, that is, groups ranked according to 
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refers only to the color of human skin or whether it (also) refers to religious purity 
and, therefore, this term reflects South Asian ritual practices rather than European racist 
concepts of the nineteenth century. The four varna comprised the brahman (commonly 
translated as “priest”), the kshatria (dubbed as “warrior”), the vaishya (“merchant” and 
“trader”), the shudra (basically all peasants, artificers and servants) and finally the pan-
chama, “untouchables” comprising all persons not belonging to the varna-system and 
therefore termed “outcast” by Europeans. However, the panchama were (and still are) 
by far the most numerous group of the population. Apart from this system, the sub-
category jati denominated a genealogical as well as occupational order, which, in a very 
restricted sense, may be compared to European guilds.34
At any time, South Asian societies consisted of hundreds of jati which the British named 
“caste.” “Caste,” however, was a phrase the Portuguese used to depict their Luso-American 
society. Castas, “ranks,” described the social order of colonial intermarriages between the 
Portuguese, Amerindians and Africans and, accordingly, also the lightness (or darkness) 
of the skin’s color. This system placed the “white” Portuguese at the top and the “black” 
African at the bottom of the social hierarchy. From their American territorial possessions 
the Portuguese transferred the term and the concept to South Asia to indiscriminately 
denominate a system which they regarded to be the general order of all Hindu-societies. 
Yet, when the British were about to politically dominate the South Asian subcontinent 
from the beginning of the nineteenth century, they had no clear idea of what they, the 
British, meant by “caste,” as “caste” was often synonymously used with “tribe,” “family,” 
“clan,” “class” or “occupational group.”35
For administrative reasons the British referred to the term “caste” as a means to classify 
the society of their Indian empire. The census which took place every decade after 1871 
referred to “caste” as the decisive marker of South Asia’s societies. During the following 
decades “caste” became a more and more rigid category culminating in the Census of In-
dia in 1901 and 1911 when caste was turned into a rigid unit strictly demarcating South 
Asia’s social groups and societies. In the decades to come, this invented “caste-system” 
became an unchangeable and impregnable order, a uniform grid indiscriminately placed 
over all South Asian Hindu-societies. The “caste-system” was a bureaucratic construc-
tion of British colonial administrators relying on European Indologists’ and British ad-
ministrators’ expertise to systematize, homogenize, and to ultimately police and govern 
scarcely known South Asian societies. As a modern sociological entity, the “caste-system” 
tells more about the colonial states’ and its bureaucratic representatives’ need for govern-
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The strength of this orientalist discourse is demonstrated in the convergence of the Brah-
man and the British perception of the “Indian society” in the environment of urban 
Calcutta during the second half of the nineteenth century. At that time Calcutta was 
not only the seat of British power in India, the hub of a distinguished Bengal literary 
culture and an industrializing city, but it also became the place where indentured labor-
ers, commonly called “coolies,”37 were concentrated in depots for their shipment to the 
plantation colonies in the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean. Most kulis originated from 
the so-called backward regions of mountainous South Asia; they were dispossessed and 
impoverished members of tribal societies in Chota Nagpur, situated in the present fed-
eral states Jharkand and Chattisgarh of the Indian Union.38 Gangs of recruited kulis were 
driven through the streets of Calcutta towards the depots. Members of the bhadralog, 
the middling class and nouveau riches, as well as the old Bengal zamindar-elite (absentee 
landlords) of the urban society regarded these people as the scum of the Indian populace 
as well as the society.39 
Only recently, the bhadralog had adopted British perceptions of the “Indian society” in 
concordance with Brahman ideals of purity as well as British classifications of a likewise 
idealist “Indian society” merged into a common perception of the lower and lowest stra-
tum of the colonial society. Tribal members in the city of Calcutta disturbed the image of 
the urban society which was supposed to be rational, organized, and therefore modern. 
Though Bengalis were not particularly fair skinned people, the dark(er) skinned and, 
according to their understanding, certainly less civilized tribal members represented the 
“Other” of Bengal’s colonial society. This perception supported the British construction 
of white dominance as the upper stratum of the Bengal urban population, which aligned 
itself with the ruling British class for reasons of social acknowledgement and politi-
cal participation. This did not mean that the bhadralog did not possess a distinguished 
image of itself that in many ways set itself apart from the colonial British society. Yet, 
adopting and / or integrating images of the British with respect to the latter’s perception 
of the “Indian society” was a means of the former’s self-understanding.40 In the same 
way, neighboring Orissa urbanites of Puri and Katak (Cuttack) helped to legitimize the 
colonial regime by supporting its sanitation and health policy with regard to leprosy. 
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British officials segregated and removed the infected from public spaces particularly in 
pilgrim centers. Moreover, the isolation of patients in newly constructed leprosy asylums 
in order to protect the overall population often took place with the approval of the Orissa 
middling class and elite.41 
However, sharing common values with “Indians,” thus blurring racial differences, was 
substantially threatening to the British self-understanding of moral and racial superior-
ity. Due to the tropical climate, Bengalis were regarded as effeminate, meaning physically 
as well as mentally weak people.42 This contrasted to the notion of South Asia’s “martial 
races,” the bellicose Ghurkhas and Sikhs. After the Great Rebellion of 1857–59, when 
Indian soldiers in the British-Indian army rebelled or mutinied (which is why that war 
is still called “The Mutiny” in many histories on South Asia) soon to be supported by 
peasants and merchants throughout large parts of northern India, the British reorgan-
ized their Indian-army personnel. Instead of recruiting “sipahis” as Indian soldiers to the 
British service from Hindustan (the region between Delhi and Patna), who had been dis-
banded due to their disloyalty, the British now preferred soldiers which they had beaten 
in their war against Nepal in 1814–16 and the Sikhs in 1846–48.43 Since the latter helped 
to suppress the “Mutiny,” they were regarded as trustworthy and therefore preferred as 
recruits until the end of British rule in India.44 The same counted for the Ghurkhas of 
southern Nepal who were recruited because of their fierce fighting habits.45
Apart from the acknowledged martiality of some “Indian races,” the British, of course, 
insisted upon their superiority with respect to military technology and modern warfare. 
This superiority was again based upon European civilization and as a significant marker 
of European “whiteness.” However, this concept was challenged when the British en-
countered Pakhtun tribes during their campaigns in Afghanistan in 1880–82. Some of 
the “warriors” had red hair, freckles and light colored eyes which made them, according 
to the then existing western racial concepts, members of the “Caucasian” race.46 At least 
in the mountains of the Hindukush, European constructions of races and self-claimed 
superiority seemed to have come to a preliminary end. Instead, the British turned to an 
interior civilizing mission. As Bengalis were regarded as effeminate and therefore not 
worthy of being civilized, attention was drawn to the savage peoples such as the Bhils 
of Khandesh or other “tribes” which, due to their allegedly most uncivilized way of life, 












5 | Michael Mann
to be maintained. With respect to the civilizing efforts of the Salvation Army, the coloni-
al regime could demonstrate its accomplished civilizing mission, since few “uncivilized” 
people were transformed into “orderly” inhabitants.48
More threatening than sharing common perceptions of the colonial society was the fact 
that quite a number of Europeans did not fit into the overall picture of the superior 
white ruler. This was particularly true with European prostitutes working in the big port 
cities of Bombay, Calcutta, Karachi, Rangun and Colombo, yet also in some up-coun-
try cantonments like Lahore, Agra and Kanpur. Since the early 1820s, British officers 
complained about British soldiers’ wives drinking too much and pursuing a rather liberal 
lifestyle which was not regarded as appropriate for a member of the ruling class. After 
1869, when the “European Vagrancy Act” had been resolved, the colonial government 
deported British women from time to time because of their disgraceful life of prosti-
tution and drunkenness. Already in 1865, the Bombay government had established a 
“saving asylum” to prevent poor British women from prostitution. Three decades later 
a meeting of the “Calcutta Social Purity Committee” still complained about European 
prostitutes as disgraceful to civilization and an insult to British manhood.49
White women offering their body to men in front of allegedly inferior races or, far worse, 
selling their bodies to Indian men was unbearable for British men in India and Great 
Britain. Against the background of the pretended unbridgeable racial gap, European 
prostitutes were seen as “misfits.” Their mere existence seemed to undermine the imperial 
politics of racial superiority, which rendered segregation of British and Indians necessary. 
The prostitution of European women challenged, attacked and threatened the very core 
of colonial legitimacy which was based on the ideology of superiority with respect to 
race, morals and values, in short: higher civilization. Agitation in Great Britain as well 
as in India tried to stop human trafficking, yet governments in British India as well as 
in Ceylon seemed indifferent and ambiguous. Many of the prostitutes’ customers had 
a governmental or military background and especially the upper ranks of the colonial 
administration visited white prostitutes, mirroring the “double-morale” of the ruling 
class.
Virtually all prostitutes from Europe originated from the eastern regions, in particu-
lar from Poland, eastern Germany, the eastern parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 






49	 This	and	the	 following	paragraphs	are	based	on	H.	Fisher-Tiné,	“White	women	degrading	themselves	 to	 the	
lowest	depths“:	European	Networks	of	Prostitution	and	Colonial	Anxieties	in	British	India	and	Ceylon	ca.	880–
94,	 in:	 Indian	 Economic	 and	 Social	 History	 Review	 40,2	 (2003),	 pp.	 3-90.	 A	 shorter	 German	 version	 has	
appeared	as	“The	greatest	blot	on	British	rule	in	the	East“:	‘Weißer	Sklavenhandel’	und	die	britische	Kolonialherr-
schaft	in	Indien	(ca.	80–920),	in:	Comparativ	3	(2003),	4,	pp.	4-3.
Invented Superiority: British Self-Perception and Indian Responses in Colonial South Asia | 5
pimps organizing human trafficking.50 They were part of a globally organized prostitu-
tion market covering the Atlantic on the one side and the Indian Ocean up to Shanghai 
on the other side.51 Peripatetic pimps and prostitutes were part of growing global human 
migration patterns during the second half of the nineteenth century. Looking at British 
India, most of the brothels were owned and run by former prostitutes: “mistresses.” The 
distribution of brothels and prostitutes also indicates the customers’ social standing since 
first class brothels were situated in the wealthier parts of a city while second and third 
class brothels were to be found in the poor quarters. As may be expected, wealthy Indians 
also used to visit European prostitutes. Seemingly white women had a kind of “exotic 
attraction” which to “possess” was often seen as some sort of “revenge” or compensation 
for the British territorial possession of South Asia, including the humiliations South 
Asians had to endure.52
Despite the overall critique, most British (men) thought that white prostitutes may ven-
tilate white men’s sexual desires, which is why it would be inappropriate to prohibit 
white prostitution and deport the prostitutes. This also helps to explain the government’s 
ambiguity. However, to self-justify that opinion, British administrators resorted to the 
existing inner-European racism with respect to Slaves and Jews. Pimps were regarded as 
the lowest class of continental Jews, their business being disgraceful to the Anglo-Saxon 
race. Likewise, prostitutes became “orientalized” when, according to a police officer in 
Colombo, prostitutes of eastern Europe had nothing in common with British “memsa-
hibs.” Though there were never more than 350 white prostitutes in South Asia, some 
representatives of the British government and particularly non-governmental organiza-
tions were still deeply concerned about their presence. In 1913 a British officer in the 
Panjab stated:
The prestige of the ruling race is affected by the degeneration of its members, especially if 
they are females. It matters not that the Austrians, Poles and Russian Jewesses who are the 
victims of the trade are wholly alien to the British race. In the eyes of the general popula-
tion, the distinction is not recognised. These women with their white skins come from the 
West, whence come the rulers of this country, and the whole European community has to 
bear the shame of their presence.53
In Ceylon, white prostitution was prohibited in 1912, followed by Burma in 1921. All 
prostitutes were deported to Europe, yet only after some massive campaigning of purity 
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controlling white prostitutes in a limited number of brothels. In Calcutta, for example, 
the infamous “German barracks” were shifted from a rather central part of town to the 
southern periphery. Only in 1915 were a great number of European prostitutes deport-
ed, yet not because of their profession but because they had either German or Austrian 
passports and were therefore regarded as “hostile aliens.” 
Apart from white prostitution, many European, mostly British, sailors and soldiers be-
came part of the Calcutta poor, living as loafers, beggars and drunkards in the city’s 
suburbs. This also happened in other towns of British India, yet the problem was most 
challenging in Calcutta as it was the seat of British power. The problem of European 
sailors became prevalent after the Great Rebellion/“Mutiny.” Some 2,500 seaman had 
been recruited to support the regular troops of the British Indian army. During their 
stay up-country, the maritime troops became infamous for their disorderly behavior. The 
situation became worse when they were disbanded and sent back to Calcutta in March 
1859, where they stayed, unemployed, for months. Additionally, the number of deserters 
from merchant ships was fairly high, thus aggravating the problem of drunken, violent 
and begging seamen. Most of the time, however, they were to be found loitering around 
crowded Bow Bazar area and sleeping on the open ground of centrally situated Maidan, 
or visiting the city’s brothels. The situation only improved when the majority of the sea-
men could finally find work on merchant ships as trade activities increased enormously 
after the end of the Rebellion.
The same situation reoccurred after a severe cyclone ravaged the Bay of Bengal in 1864. 
Thirty six ships were completely destroyed and some one hundred were severely dam-
aged. More than 1,000 seamen sought shelter in Calcutta. By July 1865, still more than 
500 seamen were unemployed, which caused the same problems as in 1859. British 
officials again felt extremely uncomfortable with the situation as the disorderly, and in 
some instances, criminal seamen undermined the image of British racial superiority. Sea-
men seemed to be a constant source for annoyance, trouble and shame. Their behavior 
brought them close to the (maintained) uncivilized state of the lower class Indians re-
garded as dangerous. More importantly, however, was the fact that the European seamen 
threatened to blur the otherwise strictly drawn line between the ruling class and the ruled 
classes. Under such circumstances rule seemed to be not a matter of race but of class. This 
is emphasized by the fact that the upper classes of Calcutta’s Indian urban society were 
shocked by the public behavior of the seamen and condemned it strongly, again aligning 
themselves with the British.54 
However, it was not only the European seamen that caused severe problems, but also 
the many unemployed Europeans which aggravated the situation of begging, loitering 
and vagrancy in the major towns of British India. The problem became particularly 
prominent after immigration laws were dissolved in 1833. As a result of technological 
constructions such as the railways, the telegraph, and canals, many Europeans found 
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employment in India. Indians were regarded as being unfamiliar with western technol-
ogy and therefore only engaged in simple earth works. Until the 1870s, thousands of Eu-
ropeans emigrated to British India, and in 1871 some 80,000 “non-official” Europeans 
worked on the building sites of the empire. As more and more Indians were employed 
due to racial categories of salaries, making them comparatively cheaper, many Europeans 
became unemployed. Like the seamen, they became a public nuisance, living as loafers, 
begging in the white quarters of South Asian towns. 
Additionally, severe sickness and accidents were often other reasons for social depriva-
tion. Many of the unemployed became alcoholics. These Europeans also threatened not 
only the public order but also the political structure of the colonial edifice as the drunk-
en, begging and roaming seamen had. To prevent it from collapsing, the British govern-
ment in India passed the “European Vagrancy Act” in 1869. The law, it was argued, was 
necessary because vagrancy was “a grave political danger through the discredit which it 
casts upon the entire British race.”55 Apart from two amendments in 1871 and 1874 the 
law remained on the statute books until the end of British rule in India. According to the 
Vagrancy Act, any person being found begging or loafing could be arrested by the police, 
summoned before the magistrate and sent to the workhouse. If such a person failed to 
find employment within a certain time he could be deported to Europe. Between 1876 
and 1895, a total of 5682 people were registered as loafers, just below 300 people on 
an annual average. Yet, it is very likely that the real number of loafers in British India 
amounted to some 3,000 annually.
Apparently the colonial administration had difficulties in dealing with European va-
grants, seamen and prostitutes. The Vagrancy Act was a weak solution to the grave prob-
lem (at least the British ruling elite as well as the Indian elite saw it as a grave problem) 
because the law was never strictly implemented as the number of “unofficial” vagrants 
indicates. Deportation was the last resort whilst most people registered under the Va-
grancy Act were sought to be “disciplined” and “civilized” through the strict regime of 
the workhouse for Europeans. However, surveillance, punishment and reform as major 
components of this disciplining regime were never rigidly enforced. On the contrary, it 
seems very likely that the colonial regime rather kept and hid European misfits from the 
Indian public. Apart from the fact that the Indian elite, as has been shown above, found 
itself seriously disturbed if not threatened by the “uncivilized” behavior of lower class 
Europeans, it seems that this problem only existed in the mind of the British elite who 
suspected that the colonial regime lacked any form of hegemony and that the colonial 
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4. Allopathy versus Ayurveda and Unani Tibb
During the nineteenth century, medicine became a spacious field on which the colonial 
state challenged Indian medical systems like Unani tibb and ayurveda as well as its prac-
titioners, hakims and vaidyas. From the beginning of what has been termed the “colonial 
encounter” in South Asia at the turn of the sixteenth century, western doctors were in-
terested in South Asian medical systems including botanical and geological knowledge. 
During the following three centuries the initial encounter and mutual interest changed 
into the rejection of South Asian medical treatment methods.57 It was only for political 
reasons that western allopathy was gradually recognized as the sole scientific medical 
system. And again it was the colonial regimes’ claimed superiority, now with respect to 
science and in particular medicine, which rendered such a political decision necessary. 
South Asian Unani tibb and ayurveda had to be excluded from the tableau of medical 
systems for they also threatened British colonial cultural and racial self-understanding. 
Finally, and after long struggles, this was accomplished in 1912 with the Registration of 
Medical Practitioners Act, which unilaterally granted the approbation of medical practi-
tioners educated according to western medical “standards.”58 
The Indian Medical Service (IMS) became the most powerful instrument to implement 
the colonial state’s medical policy in the course of the nineteenth century. The IMS owed 
its origins to the medical requirements of the EIC’s mercantile personnel in India. With 
the territorial expansion of the EIC and the growing permanent civil and military estab-
lishment from the middle of the eighteenth century, a permanent medical establishment 
was required to meet the medical needs of the EIC, in particular that of the army. At the 
end of the eighteenth century, the IMS comprised 234 surgeons and assistant surgeons. 
After years of constant warfare and expansion, the number of IMS doctors had risen to 
roughly 650 by 1824, and thereafter its number of members fluctuated between 650 and 
820. From the 1830s onwards, various newly founded medical colleges trained Indians 
in the science of western medicine in order to enlarge the number of assistant doctors. 
For racial reasons the IMS remained a “white” organization until the end of the nine-
teenth century, and it was only British candidates’ lack of interest that necessitated the 
opening of the IMS for Indian candidates.59
However, the IMS was never the homogeneous cadre which it was supposed to be. Dur-
ing the first half of the nineteenth century, debates about the values of Unani tibb and 
ayurveda were still ongoing. Even at the end of the nineteenth century, European medi-
cal practitioners acknowledged the values of South Asian medicine. At the time when 
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of Europe, allopathy was set in sharp contrast to the existing medical systems of South 
Asia. Unani tibb, it was argued by IMS officials, was still based on ancient Greek medi-
cal knowledge and, additionally, was connected with religion (i.e., Islam), which is why 
Unani medicine could no longer be regarded as a scientific medical system. Likewise, 
ayurveda was seen as unscientific for it was linked too closely with the Hindu religion, 
which is why it too had to be repelled as a non-scientific medical system. Both medical 
systems, it was maintained, may have had some practical value in the past but presently 
their degeneration, like the Indian society and culture at large, was undeniable. It was 
then for purely ideological reasons that Unani tibb and ayurveda were denied the status 
of science.60
Some examples may illustrate how the British implemented allopathy as an official medi-
cal system in British-India. On the one hand, tuberculosis and smallpox were diseases 
which were not specifically tropical as they also occurred in Europe as in other parts of 
the world. Western medicine could, therefore, demonstrate its universal validity as a 
globally applicable medical treatment and successful remedy. On the other hand, malaria 
and especially cholera were regarded as tropical diseases, the latter occurred endemically 
in Bengal despite having spread pandemically all over the globe during the 1830s. It 
was maintained by a British politician however that disease in India was not disease in 
England (meaning Europe) because cultural habits, personal hygene, living conditions, 
and religious beliefs were fundamentally different. Despite the latest findings by Robert 
Koch who had visited Calcutta in 1882 and who recognized the “comma-bacillus” as 
the transmitter of cholera and water as the method of transmission, the superintendent 
of the IMS, James Cuningham, opposed any such theory. Since he was a strict adherent 
of the miasmatic and localized theory, he prevented British doctors in the provinces of 
British India from publishing their findings that would have confirmed Koch’s bacterio-
logical theory.61 Additionally, officials in British India systematically veiled the problems 
of cholera.62
At the same time, the British imperial government in London was not particularly inter-
ested in any bacteriological theory as the agreements of the International Health Con-
ventions would have stipulated the strict implementation of quarantine regulations in 
the ports of the British Empire. For commerce and security, as well as military reasons, 
such measures were to be avoided. Indeed, disease in India had to be different from dis-
ease in England. Whereas in Europe cholera infections could be controlled by generally 
applied sanitary measures, cholera in India continued to cause high mortality rates even 
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victims was decreasing in the military cantonments of the British soldiers in India while 
it increased in the barracks of the Indian soldiers.63 
Smallpox seems of particular interest as variolation64 was the generally acknowledged 
and therefore applied method of prophylaxis by both the south Indian medical practi-
tioners as well as by members of the IMS.65 Vaccination was introduced to the staff of 
the IMC in the Madras Presidency at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and serial 
variolation campaigns started after smallpox appeared on a large scale in 1802. Fierce 
debates took place between south Indian medical practitioners and British doctors about 
the appropriate method of variolation, as vaccination was rejected by many upper class 
Hindus because of the use of cow-lymph. At the same time, British doctors argued that 
for cultural reasons as well as reasons of political acceptance, variolation should be kept 
on the list of officially recommended prophylactic methods. For some time the IMC of 
the Madras Presidency seems to have followed this strategy, stressing however that vari-
olation was only acceptable after British medical practitioners had improved the method 
according to western scientific standards. Yet, within a few years, the colonial authorities 
redirected their campaign to promote vaccination with specific reference to the benevo-
lence and humanity of the European medical community.66
Given the fact that vaccination, in contradistinction to variolation, was indeed safer be-
cause cow-pox material did not cause the outbreak of smallpox as sometimes happened 
with human material, it can be concluded that it was not for medical but for political 
reasons that variolation was acknowledged officially, namely to establish the superiority 
of European civilization. The same arguments were brought forward at the end of the 
nineteenth century when tuberculoses was diagnosed for the first time in British India. 
By 1910, when the Madras government dealt with the imminent problem of tuberculosis 
in many of the Presidency’s cities, it had become clear that first, the disease was spreading 
more rapidly than first thought, second, it affected new regions, and third, more people 
than ever, particularly in urban settlements, were affected by the new disease. It was this 
scenario which placed tuberculosis on the agenda of the colonial state, while the likewise 
expanding imperial sciences of medicine became another tool with which to rule.67
The British could hardly control, let alone explain, the prolific disease. Since the disease 
occurred mostly in growing towns and there in the most congested areas, it was argued 
that tuberculosis was not necessarily the price of progress but a disease of the improperly 
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civilized. Again, while European cities were regarded as places of progress where industry, 
culture and civilization culminated, the very same phenomenon was turned against the 
Indian urban inhabitants. Against this background, the Secretary of State for India, Lord 
Morley, stated in 1909 that the IMS was a wonderful institution and that its members 
were doing glorious work, yet there were only two things in India which were bad: the 
climate and the natives. Racism assisted in marking the difference: while the white Eu-
ropean race was strong and healthy and could, therefore, efficiently deal with diseases 
like tuberculosis, it was the degenerated Indian who made the attempted treatments and 
remedies come to naught.68
Indian medical practitioners reacted strongly against the general onslaught of Indian 
culture and civilization. During the Swadeshi Movement (1905-8, swadeshi: swa: self; 
desh: country, meaning economic production for ones’ own country), there were efforts 
to revitalize Ayurvedic medicine, following an agenda to systematize knowledge, estab-
lish training institutions and standardize a medical system. Indian medical practitioners 
founded medical schools and dispensaries. They also produced a counter-aetiology stress-
ing that western medicine originated and was developed in an alien culture and environ-
ment and was, therefore, not suitable for the body and mind of South Asians. Stressing 
the holistic arguments of Unani tibb and ayurveda according to which the whole human 
body had to be considered when diagnosing, treating and curing its ailments, the reviv-
alist movements brought physiological and moral elements into the medical discourse. 
Looking closely at the arguments, it seems that promoters and protagonists used British-
European aspects of a degenerated Indian race now, vice versa, maintaining that it was 
the British who had thrown the Indian society into a crisis, destroying moral values and, 
in the long run, the physical and psychical health of its members.69 
Critique and protest against western medicine was uttered in many Indian newspapers. 
Most of which were published in English (yet owned by Indians). However, vernacular 
newspaper articles also dealt with Unani medicine. Particularly in the big metropolises 
of British India where the problems of sanitation and medical care became most salient, 
the press published the opinions of medical practitioners and politicians.70 Almost all 
Indian doctors trained according to western allopathy echoed the “standards” of western 
medicine with respect to sanitation and public health. Yet there existed many dissenting 
voices. Essentially, Indian critique complained about the insufficient financial support 
from the government. With respect to preventive measures, critics opposed any form of 
forced inoculation campaigns by the IMS. Yet, hakims and vaidyas vehemently protested 
against the Registration of Medical Practitioners Act of 1912. They argued that most 
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and vaidyas wanted recognition of the death certificates they issued and the right to sue 
patients for failure to pay their bills, which was never granted.71
Even the otherwise generally accepted European surgery was opposed with severe cri-
tique. According to one opinion, most Indians go to the hospital only to die where 
British doctors mercilessly hack and hew instead of treating the body as the native doc-
tors do with drugs and balsams. Indigenous medicine was regarded as best suited to the 
Indian climate and constitution.72 Moreover, doctory ilaj, which was the Urdu-term for 
western medical treatment, was criticized for its only scientific methods, ignoring other 
methods of medicine. Among the Unani tibb and some ayurveda medical practitioners, 
four positions of how to react to the colonial state’s challenge became prominent. First, 
the modernists unanimously and uncritically favored western medicine. Second, the pur-
ists simply rejected all forms and knowledge of western allopathy. Third, the reformists 
who sought to reform the existing medical systems thereby included the best from the 
west. And finally the synthetists, who favored a general merger of all existing medical 
systems.73 
In any case, it must be noted that in the urban environment of the big cities where doc-
tors who practiced allopathy were available, only ten percent of the population visited 
such doctors whereas the “rest” preferred Indian hakims and vaidyas. Almost all people 
living in the countryside had no access to doctory and had to rely on Unani tibb and 
ayurveda. In some ways the history of medicine in British India, the story about Unani 
tibb and ayurveda versus allopathy, reflects a purely colonial discourse. Part of this co-
lonial discourse and public critique was the invention of ayurveda as a national Indian 
health system which systematized and homogenized local and regional variants with the 
emergent national movement between 1880 and 1930.74 Even today most Indians prefer 
or have to, for pecuniary reasons, consult hakims and vaidyas. Only surgery has been ac-
cepted by most people in South Asia as a beneficial medical treatment. 
5. Summary: On the Creation of a Modern Myth
At the same time the English started to colonize countries and societies across the sea, 
they created an ideology of having a superior civilization. Colonial rule was for the benefit 
of the subdued people, whether they were Irish, Amerindians or, later, Indians. Initially 
claimed cultural superiority was, from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, 
“strengthened” by racial ideology, marking the difference between white superiority and 
“colored” inferiority. Within the European context it seemed rather easy to maintain this 
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savages, their manners and morals un-developed, and their societies rude; in short, they 
were uncivilized. However, within the colonial setting, that superiority was often difficult 
to maintain. At least the Indian case demonstrates that creating the modern myth of cul-
tural and racial superiority only partially worked, as could be exemplified with Gandhi’s 
and Nehru’s inversion of the discourse on modernization.
Generally seen, the claimed superiority was permanently challenged by Indian middle 
and upper classes. According to their manners and morals (be they of “Indian” origin or 
developed in the colonial urban context), they aligned themselves with the British ruling 
elite. This was, on the one hand, regarded as a positive effect as it helped to stabilize the 
colonial regime. On the other hand, such an “alliance” blurred the claimed cultural and 
racial superiority. For the British, however, it was difficult to create the Homo Europaeus 
image within South Asian societies – which they probably did not aim to do. Hegemony 
was never on the agenda of the British colonial regime.75 This is in sharp contrast to 
the image the British ruling class in India had of itself. Many administrative, legal, and 
social efforts were undertaken to uphold that myth. Nevertheless, it worked in one re-
spect, namely that of a strong people commanding a seemingly invincible army. Yet, the 
carnage of European armies in the trenches of Flanders during World War I terminated 
the ideology of the civilizing mission in British India as well as the myth of a superior 
civilization represented by the Homo Europaeus.
5	 Guha,	Dominance	without	Hegemony	(see	note	5)
